期刊文献+

企业报酬机制与人力资本投资 被引量:3

The Compensation Mechanism of Enterprise and Investment in Human Capital
下载PDF
导出
摘要 由于企业与员工双方都以自己的收益最大化为目标函数,所以当企业采取对产出按比例分成的报酬机制时,会导致双边道德风险,从而使员工实际的人力资本投资力度和工作努力程度以及企业的实际相关投入力度都低于整个社会福利最大化时的力度。如果企业能够采取另外一种报酬机制,使员工拥有完全剩余索取权,就能够使企业与员工都选择社会福利最大化时人力资本投资力度和工作努力程度以及相关投入力度。 Because the enterprise and employee all want to maximize own income, so when enterprise adapts to the percentage compensation mechanism, there would exist double morals hazard. The degree of investment inhuman capital, working hard and the connected investment of enterprise will little than the degree which the enterprise and employee want to maximize whole social welfare. If the business emerprise can adopt another compensation mechanism, which makes the employee own the complete surplus, enterprise and employee will choose the degree of investment inhuman capital, working hard and the connected investment of enterprise, which the enterprise and employee want to maximize whole social welfare.
作者 田盈 蒲勇健
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI 2006年第2期24-27,共4页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 教育部高校博士点科研基金(20020611009) 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(02JA790062)
关键词 人力资本 投资 机制 激励 博弈 human capital investment mechanism incentive game
  • 相关文献

参考文献9

  • 1Becker G.S. Investment in human capital: a theoretical analysis[J].Journal of Political Economy, 1962,70(5): 9-49.
  • 2Acemoglu D. Training and innovation in an imperfect labor market[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1997,64:445-464.
  • 3Acemoglu D. Pischke J. Beyond Becker: Training in imperfect labor markets[J]. Economic Journal, 1999,109,112-142.
  • 4Chang C., Wang Y. Human capital investment under asymmetric information: the pigovian conject revisited [J]. Journal of Labor Economics, 1996,14(3):505-519.
  • 5Katz E., Ziderman A. Investment in general training: the role of information and labor mobility[J]. Economic Journal, 1990,100: 1147-1158.
  • 6Acemoglu D. Pischke J, Certification of training and training outcomes[J]. European Economic Review, 2000,44: 917-927.
  • 7骆品亮,司春林.专用性人力资本投资激励研究[J].管理科学学报,2001,4(2):19-24. 被引量:49
  • 8Abduliah Y. Seller-Broker relations as a double moral hazard problem[J]. Journal of Housing Economics, 1995,4: 244-263.
  • 9Holmstrom B. Managerial incentive problem: a dynamic perspective[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1999,66: 169-182.

共引文献48

同被引文献26

引证文献3

二级引证文献7

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部