地方政府债务违约的博弈理论分析

Analysis on the Game Theory about Local Debt Defaults

伴随着财政分权,世界范围内,地方公共债务的日渐膨胀以及拖欠或违约已不是个别现象, 情况严重的甚至引发了一国宏观经济的不稳定。但是,要全面考察地方政府债务违约和中央政府救助动机绝非易事。本文试图梳理解释地方政府债务违约的博弈理论,分析地方债务违约博弈中,双方的动机,以探索控制地方政府债务违约的制度、经济、政治等方面的基本因素。

With the fiscal decentralization, local debt increasingly expands and debt defaults are not scarce in the world, some of which resulted in severe instability of macro-economy. However, it is not easy to review the initiatives of local government defaults and central government bailouts. This paper tries to summarize game theory about local debt defaults, analyses the initiatives of both sides in the game and finds the basic institutional , economic and political factors to control it .