摘要
高科技企业由于其经营产品技术的复杂性,往往存在着严重的委托代理问题,企业所有者通常都会通过一定的激励手段来协调经理与股东的经营目标,最为常见的是税后利润提成.从利润提成的期权意义出发,发现利润提成能够一定程度上激励经理提高业绩,但是也激发了经理追逐高风险的行为.针对利润分享激励的负效应,提出了一些可行的建议.
A high-tech firm is seriously bothered by commission-agency problems due to its business complexity. Profit-related bonus is widely applied to harmonize the interests of shareholders and managers. Based on the option theory, even though the managers are positively motivated to improve the firm＇s performance to some extent, the bonus contract also motivates the managers to pursue high risky investments. To reduce the negative effect caused by profit-related bonus, some approaches are presented at the end of this article.
出处
《研究与发展管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第2期46-49,70,共5页
R&D Management
