生命共同体:生态伦理学的基础范畴

Life Community: Basic Category of Ecological Ethnics

综观现今诸多生态伦理观的基础范畴,其理论前提的基本预设,都存在着思维方式上以本质主义的普遍性取消复杂整体包含的差异性、论证材料上自然科学与人文社会科学相分割、逻辑推论上将“实然”与“应然”关系简单化的缺陷,这就难以从理论上合理地确证人类应该对谁承担生态义务以及承担何种生态义务。生命共同体范畴则不存在这些严重缺陷。作者通过分析生命共同体范畴相对于利奥波德提出的“生物共同体”范畴的优越之处,认为前者理应替代后者,并阐明了生命共同体这个基础范畴对于建立生态伦理学的重大意义。

Limitations exist in the basic category of modem ecological ethnics. In its theory premise, it stresses the universality of essentialism while ignores the divergence of complex whole. In argumentation, it cuts apart the relations between natural and social sciences. In logic inference, it simplifies the relations between ＂be＂ and ＂should be＂. These limitations make it difficult to clarify to whom human beings should undertake the ecological duty and what the duty is. By analyzing the superiority of ＂life community＂ over ＂biotic community＂, the category advanced by Leopold, the author concludes that the former should substitute for the latter. Moreover, the significance of life community as the basic category of ecological ethnics is expounded.