地方政府财政政策与企业股权融资:理论与实证

The Relationships between the Fiscal Policies of Local Governments and Equity Financing of Enterprises in China: Theory and Evidence

论文通过建立连续时间动态讨价还价模型对地方政府与企业所有者之间的博弈关系进行了理论研究,并对双方策略选择关系进行了实证检验。理论研究的结果表明,如果博弈双方的时间偏好相同,剩余控制权(或者称之为相对讨价还价优势)的配置与博弈双方的福利水平无关;而时间偏好不相同时,剩余控制权的配置将影响双方的福利水平,这个研究结论与是否存在交易成本不必相关。通过实证研究,论文的研究结果表明:(1)地方政府追求预算外盈余的行为会导致其增加财政支出最终导致财政赤字持续增加,但这些财政赤字并没有为企业股权融资提供有效的支持;(2)地方政府的财政更愿意与企业在预算外的领域合作,而企业则更愿意与地方政府在预算内合作;(3)非国有企业较国有企业更愿意和地方政府在预算外合作,而地方政府也更愿意和非国有企业在预算外的领域合作。这些实证结果说明地方政府在时间偏好不一致的情况下拥有剩余控制权。

The paper studies the relationships between the fiscal policies of local governments and firms＇ equity financing in China by continuous time dynamic bargaining game model and test the model by statistical data. The conclusion of theory is that if the time preferences of two parties in the game are consistent, the collocation of residual control right （or call it relative bargaining advantage） will not influence their welfare; but when the time preferences of two parties in the game are not consistent, the collocation of residual control right is important to the welfare of two parties, which implies that the collocation of residual control right need not be relevant to transaction costs. And the conclusions of positive research mean that： （1） when increased their extra-budgetary surplus, the local governments＂ fiscal expenditure and fiscal deficit increase continually, but the fiscal deficit does not support the equity financial behavior of enterprises; （2） the local governments would like to play the co-operative game in the extra-budgetary fields but the firms expect the game happen in the inner-budgetary; （3） the NSOEs（Non-Stated-Owned-Enterprises） more possibly play the game in the extra-budgetary fields than SOEs （Stated-Owned-Enterprises） and the local governments more possibly play the game with NSOEs than SOEs in the fields. The positive conclusions imply the local government owns the residual control right when their time preferences are not consistent.