上市公司的“壳”交易背后的资金配置效率

The Efficiency of Capital Allocation behind the Trade of 'Crust' in the Stock Market

本文从已有文献出发,建立了一个两期企业生命周期模型来分析在存在金融压抑的情况下我国证券市场中的“买壳”现象,在证券市场有效的情况下,资本应该尽可能流向好企业,均衡状态下“好壳”背后总应是好企业,但给定当前信息难以判断好坏企业。模型和实证表明“买壳”所需股份的大小可以作为识别“壳”背后好坏企业比例的标志,买壳所需股份越多,“好壳”背后好企业的概率就越大。但由于种种原因,我们难以通过对“买壳”比例的限制来调节市场上资金的配置,比例的大小仅仅作为识别“壳”背后企业类型的标志。考虑到在国内证券市场中存在非流通股与流通股的现实,笔者又将模型拓展,得出目前适合我国证券市场的政策建议:从短期来看,要防止非流通股以过低的价格转让,尤其要避免仅以净资产拍卖国有股的不当行为。从长远来看,最终要实施非流通股的减持。

The paper develops a two-period model to analyze the phenomena of ＇ Crust Trade＇ in China＇ s stock market where there are political barriers forbidding Non-government firms to enter, An implication of the efficient capital market is that capital tends to flow to the ＂ Good＂ firms whose NPV is positive. However, it is difficult to tell ＂ Good＂ firms from ＂Bad＇ones given the irrformation shared among investors. A conclusion is drawn from the model that the proportion the new company purchase to be the biggest shareholder during the Trade of＇ Crust＇ can be a strong signal. The more proportion purchased,the more the possibility that buyers are＇ Good＇ firms. But this proportion cannot be set exogenously. Considering the fact that there exists Non-tradable Capital in China＇s stock market, the revised model suggests： The government should prevent the Non-tradable Capital from being sold at a surprisingly low price in the short term. In the long term, the capital in the stock market should be all tradable.