企业并购讨价还价的动态博弈决策研究

Research on the Dynamic Game Decision-making of Enterprise M&A

构建了企业并购动态定价决策的基本博弈模型,研究结果表明,完全信息下并购定价的均衡结果是被并购方与并购方综合折现因子的函数。综合折现因子大的一方在并购过程中可以获得更多的收益,谈判回合越长,并购结果就越有利,先提出报价的一方也能在并购过程中获得更大的好处。

Confirming the price of M＆A has very important practical meaning in China. The negotiation of enterprise M＆A was a kind of non-eooperate game, it was virtually the question how the participators divided up the added value of M＆A. This article set up the basic game model of dynamic pricing decision-making. The conclusion shows that the negotiation of enterprise M＆A under complete information was the function of competitive discount factor of buyer and dicker. The bigger the competitive discount factor is, the more benefits the buyer can gain. Moreover, the longer the bout of M＆A is, the more beneficial the result is. The buyer who takes the initiative can gain more benefits.