摘要
以经济学和消费者行为学为基础,通过数学方法建立起有效话务量、运营收入与不同资费机制(即双向付费———主叫付费或被叫付费)之间关系的模型,分析价格水平以及结算成本对机制选择的影响.研究给出了价格平衡点公式,在该点双向付费与单向付费的支配关系发生变化;同时表明,由于单向付费机制存在网间和内部结算成本,使单向付费机制的价格选择区间从上下2个方面都缩小.实证数据表明,目前中国蜂窝移动的平均资费水平仍高于价格平衡点,即双向付费仍支配单向付费机制,因此中国蜂窝移动在双改单的问题上,管制机构和企业都应该慎重.
Setting up the mathematic models of the effective traffics and the operators' income under different tariff mechanisms based on the theory of economics and consumer behaviors, how the price level and the income settlement cost influent the choice of tariff mechanisms was analyzed. The study finds out that there is a break-even point of the price by which the dominant relationship between BPP (both parties pays) and CPP (calling party pays) being exchanged, and the range of the price within which CPP dominating BPP is shrunken because of existing the income settlement cost under CPP. A demonstration shows that the average price level of the cellular mobile telephone in China is still above the break-even point at the end of 2005, so it should be very cautious to transfer BPP to CPP in China.
出处
《北京邮电大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第2期127-130,共4页
Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70473006)
关键词
移动通信
资费机制
双向付费
单向付费
价格平衡点
结算成本
mobile communication
tariff mechanisms
both parties pays
calling party pays
breakeven point of price
settlement cost