权利正当性后形而上学重建的困境——评哈贝马斯《在事实与规范之间》

The Dilemna in Reconstructing the Rightness of Rights by the Post-metaphysics Approach

文章意在解构哈贝马斯关于权利正当性重建的内在逻辑。乍看之下,哈贝马斯关于权利正当性的重建似乎有循环论证的嫌疑,哈贝马斯是通过生活世界这一概念的复杂性来克服这种嫌疑的,但也付出了理论逻辑不彻底的代价。文章从人称与正当化类型的关系入手,分析了哈贝马斯是如何克服这种嫌疑的。然后,对哈贝马斯的生活世界这一概念进行了批判。最后,指出了造成哈贝马斯理论困境的内在原因。

At first glance, Habermas＇ argumentation seems in a circle. By analyzing complexity of the term ＂lifeworld＂, Habermas conquers the suspicion, but at the same time pays a price for unthoroughness of his theoretical logic. In the last chapter, beginning with relationship between person and typology of legitimacy, I will examine how Habermas overcomes the suspicion, and then criticize Habermas＇ concept of ＂lifeworld＂. At last, I will point out what leads to Haermas＇ theory＇s paradox.