基于家族企业控制权让渡的治理模式分析

A Study on Governance Structure Based on the Transfer of Family Enterprise Control Rights

在非正式信用和正式信用双重缺失的背景下,企业主的“集权情结”和经理人严重的机会主义行为使得家族企业控制权的让渡面临着“控制权损失”无法得到补偿的风险,导致了控制权让渡的失灵和家族治理结构的锁定行为。家族企业控制权的让渡是治理结构转变的关键,重新配置控制权以及改进治理结构是家族企业做大做强必须跨越的门槛,而所有权和控制权在两个维度上的不同分割,将使家族企业的治理结构沿着不同的路径方向演进。

In the background of non- official credit absence and official credit absence, the ＂centralized power complex＂ of enterprise owners and opportunistic behaviors of managers cause the transfer of family enterprise control rights to face the risk of non - compensation of ＂loss of control rights＂, thus leading to the dysftmction of control rights transfer and the fixed behaviors of family governance structure. The transfer of family enterprise control rights is the key to the transformation of governance structure. A new allocation of control fights and governance structure improvement are the thresholds for family enterprises to thrive and prosper. While the separation of owner fights and control rights will lead the development of governance structure of family enterprises in two different directions.