摘要
侦查讯问是一个信息不对称的博弈。犯罪嫌疑人在讯问中面临着首动困境;在信息不完全的情况下难以从坦白、沉默和说谎三者之间做出选择,然而他们又必须先于侦查人员做出决策,这实际上使犯罪嫌疑人处于“迫移”状态。只要犯罪嫌疑人先行决策,不论是沉默或是说谎,都会将自己独占的信息暴露给侦查人员。而就策略结果的利益分析,讯问是一个变和博弈,坦白的策略似乎可以建立一个双赢的局面,从而突破了首动困境。
The author was talking about the concept of the first-move trilemma and suspect＇s attitude,setting forth the cause of first-move trilemma,putting forward to first-move trilemma difficulty and how to break through first-move trilemma.
