摘要
本文采用结构方程模型研究了我国非国有上市公司股利政策的决策以及股利政策的选择动因。分析表明:西方股利代理成本理论适用于我国的非国有上市公司,公司所有者比公司经营者对股利政策具有更大的影响;“未来投资机会”、“再融资的能力”、“公司股票价格”和“未来偿债能力”四个因素是我国非国有上市公司制定股利政策时所考虑的重要因素,其中“再融资能力”表现得尤为突出;而我国非国有上市公司制定股利政策时不太考虑“公司盈利水平”。
This paper analyzes the decision - making of dividends policy and the reasons for dividends policy selection in non - state - owned listed companies by using structural equation model. The main findings are as follows: firstly, the dividends policy of non -state - owned hated companies can be interpreted by the agency theory, because the owner has greater influence on dividends policy than the manager. Secondly,"expected investment OlVommities" ,"expected refinancing capability", "stock price raising" and "payment capacity for debt" are all the important factors influences the dividends policy making, and "expected refinancing capability" is much more critical, but "earrfing level" plays an unconsidered role.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第1期74-85,共12页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目"我国企业投融资运作与管理研究"(项目号70232020)
南开大学211工程建设项目"现代公司治理与企业管理创新"之子项目"公司投融资管理研究"的研究成果之一
关键词
所有者
经营者
股利政策
结构方程模型
owner
manager
dividends policy
structural equation model