控股股东的控制权、所有权与公司绩效:基于中国上市公司的证据

Control Right, Ownership of Large Shareholder and Corporate Performance

本文从最终控制人的角度,根据2001-2004年中国A股市场数据,研究了控股股东的控制权和现金流权(即所有权)对公司绩效的影响,结果表明控股股东的控制权有负的“侵占效应”,现金流权则有正的“激励效应”;控制权的“侵占效应”强于现金流权的“激励效应”;随着两者分离程度的增加,公司绩效将下降,并体现出递增的边际效应。本文进一步从资金占用的角度验证了控股股东控制权和现金流权的这两种效应。

Using a firm- level dsteset of China＇ s A- share stock market over the period of 2001 - 2004, this paper examines the effects of large shareholder＇s control fights and cash flow rights on corporate Tobin- Q. We find that large shareholders＇ control rights are associated with negative ＂entrenchment effect＂ while their ownership is associated with positive ＂incentive effect＂, and ＂entrenchment effect＂ appears to be stronger than ＂incentive effect＂. As the divergence between control rights and cash flow fights widens, corporate performance deteriorates. We also confirm the effects of control fights and ownership in our further analysis of funds appropriation.