多主体预算配置低效与我国食品安全监管缺失

The Inefficiency of Multiple-body Budget Allocation and the Failure of Food Safety Supervision in China

现阶段我国食品安全监管不力的原因很多,博弈分析和事实验证表明,同单主体参与预算博弈相比,现有的预算分配模式是一种不经济、非效率的选择。要解决这一问题,需要借鉴其他国家经验,对现有的食品安全监管体制进行改革:尽快成立高度集权的单一监管机构,变我国现行的预算分配模式为单一主体参与模式。

The quality and safety of products is becoming a significant factor that has restricted the course of building a well-off society in China. China has taken food safety as an important issue in its middle and long-term science and technology planning. In order to illuminate the essential causes for the failure of food safety supervision in China, this paper, based on other studies and the Game theory, analyses and validates facts. The study result shows that the existing multi-body mode of budget allocation is not an economical and effective choice compared with the mode of single body taking part in the game of budget. To solve this problem, we should learn from the experiences of foreign countries and innovate the existing supervisory system of food safety, and establish as soon as possible a new supervisory organization which has highly centralized power, and change the existing multi-body mode of budget allocation to single-body mode.