摘要
采用拍卖理论讨论了选拔性考试的几个基本问题.在标准的考试模型中,考试对职位的分配是有效的,录取人数和应试人数的变化会影响不同考生的分数.若使被录取者的分数最大化,则应设置及格分.在能力不对称的考试中,较弱的一方可能比较强的一方更为努力.只有在不设置及格分的情况下,考试过程的租值耗散率才不会超过1.
We use the auction theory to discuss the recruitment exam. In the benchmark model of exam, efficient allocation of positions can be accomplished by the exam and number of examinees and positions has different effect on different examinees. It is profitable to sct a reserve score for a examiner who maximize winners＇ expected total scores. In the asymmetric exam, weaker new examinees may score more than stronger old examinees. The rent dissipation rate will be lower than 1 if there is not the reserve score.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第4期60-66,共7页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
关键词
选拔性考试
竞赛
租值耗散
recruitment examination
contests
rent dissipation
