摘要
本文通过构建一个三方参与的两阶段动态博弈模型,来分析东道国的知识产权保护政策对于FDI的影响。分析结果表明,对于东道国政府而言,提供适度且有效率的知识产权保护政策,不仅可以增加FDI的流入量,而且可以引进较为先进的技术,从而通过降低成本和提高产量,实现东道国社会福利最大化。同时,东道国政府在提供有效率的知识产权保护条件下,允许跨国公司按利润最大化原则选择其股权份额,是符合东道国自身利益的。而仅当东道国政府无法提供有效率的知识产权保护时,限制外商投资比例才不失为一种次佳的政策选择。
This paper builds a mold of two-stage and three-player dynamic game to analyze the influence of host country' s policy of the intellectual property right protection on FDI. The result shows that providing efficient and proper IPRP policy is the best choice for the host country for that can not only stimulate the FDI inflow, but also bring much advanced technology, which will reduce the cost and increase the output, hence maximize the welfare of the host country. Under efficient protection it is wise for the host government to allow the MNE choose the shareholding according to the profit maximization principle. If and only if the host government could not offer efficient protection, it is the second-best choice for the government to limit the MNE's shareholding.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第4期28-34,89,共8页
Economic Research Journal
关键词
知识产权保护
外商直接投资
技术转移
Intellectual Property Right Protection
FDI
Technology Transfer