表征与认知发展被引量：46

Representation and Development of Cognition

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摘要认知动力系统理论是上个世纪90年代前后,继符号主义和联结主义之后,认知科学中一种快速发展起来的理论。动力主义和符号主义之间的一个基本分歧就是关于表征在认知中的作用问题的争论。物理符号主义假设认为符号表征的计算对于认知是充分和必要的,一些持强耦合观点的动力主义者认为表征对于认知系统是不必要的。作者从认知发展着手,将认知发展区分为感觉运动、意象表征和语言表征三个水平,认为表征对于认知是必要的,但不是充分的,因为种系演化和个体发育中存在一个非表征的认知时期;但是作者也反对动力主义中完全否定和反对表征的强耦合观点。文章的结论是,尽管因为耦合而不存在完全的表征,但不完全的表征在人类的认知活动中是普遍存在的。 Following Symbolism and Connectionism, Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) has developed rapidly in the science of cognition sciences since the 1990s. One of the major differences between Dynamicism and Symbolism lies in their views on the role of representation in cognition. The Physical Symbol System Hypothesis (PSSH) holds that the computation of representation of symbols is both sufficient and necessary, while some dynamicists who support the view of Strong Coupling believe that representation is not necessary for a cognitive system. The authors of this article divide cognitive development into three levels: sensorimotor, image representation and linguistic representation. They state that representation is necessary but not sufficient to cognition, as there exists a stage of non-representation cognition in phylogeny and ontogenesis. However, the authors disagree with the strong version of coupling in Dynamicism that completely rejects representation. The article concludes that there is no full representation under the effects of coupling, but partial representation is common in human cognitive activities.

作者李恒威黄华新

机构地区浙江大学语言与认知研究国家创新基地

出处《中国社会科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第2期34-44,共11页 Social Sciences in China

关键词认知动力系统符号表征耦合不完全表征

分类号 B842.1 [哲学宗教—基础心理学]

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