马克思信用制度理论的实质与中国银企债务危机

The essence of Marx's credit system theory and the resolution to the debt crisis between China's banks and firms

作者认为：抛开资本主义形式，马克思的信用制度理论适合对中国同类问题的分析。反观我国的国有企业和国有专业银行，由于它们一方面不是独立的经济主体，不具有独立的财产权，另一方面，它们的财产来自于国家的授予或者说委托，对于财产的盈亏并不负终极财务责任，因而它们之间不可能建立起一般规范的信用关系。由此进一步认为，中国银企债务危机实质上是一种带有必然的、体制的危机，解决问题的根本出路在于通过产权变革和产权多元化，塑造独立、平等的市场主体。

Abstract The authors argue that, leaving aside the form of capitalism, the theory of Marx's credit system is suitable for analyzing the same kind of China's questions. On the one hand, since China's State firms and specialized banks are not independent economic bodies and they have no independent property rights, and on the other hand, since their properties come from thegovernment's entrusting and they aren't resposible for their losses and profits, the normal credit relationships between China's State firms and banks can't be established. Therefore,the debt crisis between China's specialized banks and enterprises is inevitable and systematic crisis. The critical way to this problem is making China's enterprises and specialized banks as independent and fair market bodies through reforming their property rights and popularizing their property rights.