企业内部横向信任关系的进化博弈分析

Study of Horizontal Trust in Enterprise Based on Evolutionary Game

在有效理性的条件下,应用进化博弈论中的复制动态机制来分析企业内部横向信任关系的长期演化趋势。分析表明:通过改变得益矩阵,鼓励和褒扬信任者、惩罚和压制背信者,是企业内部横向信任关系向最理想方向进化的两个关键。

This paper builds the duplicative dynamic model of horizontal trust in enterprise under the bounded rationality. Based on the model, the paper analyzes the evolutionary trends of horizontal trust in enterprise. It is found that the incentive to truster and the punishment to trustee by changing the matrix of payoffs are two keys.