A NEW METHOD FOR RESYNCHRONIZATION ATTACK

This paper presents a new method for resynchronization attack, which is the combination of the differential cryptanalysis and algebraic attack. By using the new method one gets a system of linear equations or low-degree equations about initial keys, and the solution of the system of equations results in the recovery of the initial keys. This method has a lower computational complexity and better performance of attack in contrast to the known methods. Accordingly, the design of the resynchronization stream generators should be reconsidered to make them strong enough to avoid our attacks. When implemented to the Toyocrypt, our method gains the computational complexity of O（2^17）, and that of 0（2^67） for LILI-128.

This paper presents a new method for resynchronization attack, which is the combination of the differential cryptanalysis and algebraic attack. By using the new method one gets a system of linear equations or low-degree equations about initial keys, and the solution of the system of equations results in the recovery of the initial keys. This method has a lower computational complexity and better performance of attack in contrast to the known methods. Accordingly, the design of the resynchronization stream generators should be reconsidered to make them strong enough to avoid our attacks. When implemented to the Toyocrypt, our method gains the computational complexity of O(217), and that of O(267) for LILI-128.