“存在”为什么是现象学本身的问题?

Why Is “Being” an Subject of Phenomenology in Itself?

胡塞尔提出的“现象学还原”的思想,首先要求把一切现成者的“存在”都“悬置”起来。这样,海德格尔的“存在”问题似乎与胡塞尔的现象学原则就是冲突的。但胡塞尔在悬置自然主义所设定的一切实在时,把那原本并非现成的实在事实、而被自然主义歪曲为现成实在的境域存在也一并悬置了,从而漏过了“存在”问题。本文试图回答这一问题:为什么海德格尔哲学中的“存在”问题是现象学本身的问题?

Husserl＇s idea of ＂phenomenological reduction＇claims to＂bracket＂ all the existing ＂Being＂. Thus Heidegger＇s ＂Being＂seems contradictory to Husserl＂ s phenomenological principle. However, while he brackets all the realities in naturalism, Husserl also brackets the being of realm which is not the existing reality by nature, but mistaken by naturalism for reality, consequently neglecting the subject of ＂Being＂. The paper attempts to answer such a question： why is ＂Being＂ in Heidegger＇ s philosophy a subject of phenomenology in itself？.