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企业并购理论评述之二:无增值理论

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摘要 并购理论包括并购增值与无增值理论。现在最广为流行的并购无增值理论包括胜者的灾祸与自大理论、作为代理问题的解决或代理问题的体现理论以及财富的再分配理论。对这些并购无增值理论的介绍充斥于诸多文献之中,在目前主要工作是对这些理论的致命缺陷性进行分析评述,并对并购增值与无增值理论作以总结性评论。
作者 刘金雄
出处 《商业研究》 北大核心 2006年第9期20-24,共5页 Commercial Research
基金 华侨大学社会科学基金资助项目
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