对证券市场欺诈行为监管的博弈分析

Analysis of the Game Model of Supervision on Swindle in the Securities Market

证券欺诈行为在任何证券市场都普遍存在,它严重影响到证券市场的规范和有序发展.通过建立证券市场欺诈行为监管模型,从微观上考查证券市场中监管者和被监管者之间的关系,分析了证券欺诈行为形成的微观机制,以及对中国证券欺诈行为监管的一些启示.

Swindle exists commonly in any securities markets, where swindle has led to serious influences on regulations and the normal development of our securities market. The paper attempts to develop a game model of supervision on swindle in the securities market so as to investigate the relationship between supervisor and supervisee from the microcosmic aspect, and analyze the microcosmic mechanism resulting to swindle in the securities market, and enlighten our securities supervision as to swindle in the securities market.