摘要
系统总结了管理层收购激励效果的理论基础,对管理层收购激励效果进行了博弈分析,发现MBO对改进管理层的整体工作效率方面具有局限性,MBO的真正激励效果与参与管理层收购的人员选择有关,而对激励全体员工努力方面的综合效果是很不明确的。
This paper summarized the theoretical basis of the incentive effect of MBO(management buy out), found the limit of MBO in improving the whole efficiency of management through the game analysis of MBO' s incentive effect, and developed that the true incentive effect should be related with the choice of people who are involved in the MBO.
出处
《武汉理工大学学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第5期137-140,共4页
Journal of Wuhan University of Technology