信息不对称下的个人住房抵押贷款交易与风险

Residential Mortgage Loan Agreements And Risks With Asymmetric Information

本文将博弈论与信息经济学理论和模型引入对个贷市场借贷双方信息结构的研究,在考虑个贷利率、抵押物价值和借款人违约概率的情况下,分别建立消费者借款购房目标函数和贷款人放贷目标函数,分析交易达成条件和贷款人放贷策略。研究表明,在信息不对称的个贷市场中,贷款人放贷策略的局限性,如利率管制会降低信用配给的有效性,导致逆向选择和道德风险的产生。依据研究结论,本文提出从成本角度改善我国个贷市场借贷双方信息结构,降低个贷市场信用风险的途径与方法。

Adopting the theories and the models in the research field of game theory and information e- conomics, the paper discussed the information structure between the borrower and the lender on the residential mortgage market. Taking the mortgage rate, collateral value and the borrower＇s default probability into account, the paper set up the objective functions of the borrower and the lender respectively, and analyzed the qualifications for the mortgage loan agreements and the lending strategies of the lender. It was found that because of the asymmetric information structure, the limitations on the lender＇s lending strategies, such as the interest rate controls would worsen the efficiency of the credit allocation on the mortgage market, and lead to the risks of the adverse selection and the moral hazard. Based on the conclusions, the paper provided some suggestions from the angle of costs, to improve the information structure and reduce the mortgage credit risks at present stage of Chinese residential mortgage market.