基于多任务委托的工程监理委托—代理分析

Multi-task Based Principal-agent Analysis for Engineering Supervision

工程监理制度下的业主与工程监理之间的关系属于多任务的委托—代理关系。根据多任务委托—代理模型分析了工程监理多任务委托—代理问题。分析表明:多任务委托—代理情况下的工程监理具有不同于单任务委托—代理情况下的激励机制;工程监理承担任务被观测的难易程度和任务间努力成本的相互依存性是影响激励强度系数的重要因素;为防止对工程监理激励效能的弱化,激励机制的设计必须充分考虑这两种因素的影响。

The relationship between a project employer and an engineering supervisor is a multi-task principalagent relationship under the framework of engineering supervision. This paper analyses the muhi-task principalagent problems on the basis of multi-task principal-agent models. It shows that the incentive system of engineering supervision with muhi-task principal-agent model is different from the one with single-task model. Two important impact factors on the incentive strength coefficient are given as the job difficulty undertaken by engineering supervisors and the cost dependency between tasks, which have to be taken into consideration for the incentive system establishment to prevent its weakness.