委托—代理理论视角的民营上市公司控制权博弈

Game Theory of Private Listed Enterprises' Control Rights on Principal-agent Theory

企业作为一系列投入要素的契约集合,其契约的核心是对企业剩余的配置。企业剩余配置机制是公司激励约束机制的核心,股东和管理者的激励约束机制是一种双向的动态的重复博弈过程。关于公司控制权的争夺本质上也是为了通过创造更大的信息不对称度来获得更大的企业剩余控制权,对公司控制权的争夺过程就是这种动态重复博弈的表现。但是, 中国民营上市公司实际上处于一种古典类型向现代企业的初级转型阶段,公司的股权虽然分散,但股东通过各种方式强化了对公司的控制权,管理者与股东争夺控制权的博弈并不明显, 导致管理层与股东形成“联合企业家”、通过“侵占效应”、“共谋”侵占。

Enterprise is an integration of a series of input factors and core of contract is the stronger control on enterprisers surplus through creating more information asymmetry. The process of the struggle on the enterprisers control is the representation of the dynamic and repetitive game. However, the China＇ s private listed enterprise, indeed, is on the course of the junior step of the transformation from a classic one to a modern one. Although the share is dispersed, the shareholders strengthen its control on the enterprise and there is no obvious game on the enterprise＇s control between managers and shareholders. Consequently, the management and shareholders come into being a so called combined entrepreneur, and they conspire against the corrosion in the way of corrosion effect.