摘要
中国上市公司普遍享受了国家的税收优惠和名目繁多、各地差异明显的财政补贴。其中最典型的是农业上市公司。为支持农业产业化经营的发展,利用证券市场发展农业,国家以及省、地政府给予了农业上市公司更为深入而持久的优惠补贴政策。本文选取1998年前(含1998年)上市的36家农业上市公司,利用非均衡面板数据,对国家的财政扶持政策以及税收优惠政策给予农业上市公司绩效的影响进行实证分析。结果表明,税收优惠政策对农业上市公司产出无明显效应,而直接财政补贴政策的副作用是显著增加了企业的偿债能力,从而导致了企业管理层的寻租及偷懒行为。
Chinese listed companies generally enjoy national taxpreferences and direct subsidies from regional governments. The most typical case is the listed agribusiness. To use security market for promoting the development of agriculture integration, the listed agribusiness were provided with more abroad and lasting taxpreferences and subsidies by the central and local governments. The paper made an analysis of taxpreferences and subsidy on operating performance with a sample of 36 publicly-traded agribusiness before or in 1998 on an unbalanced panel data. The result implicated that taxpreferences had no statistically significance on the growth of the listed agribusiness and an unexpected side-effect was found that the direct subsidy improved firms＇ solvency position substantially, which led to the rent-seeking and shirking behavior of firms＇ management team.
出处
《产业经济研究》
2006年第3期53-59,共7页
Industrial Economics Research
关键词
补贴收入
农业上市公司
农业产业化
绩效
subsidy
listed agribusiness
agriculture integration
performance
