摘要
在三方代理理论框架下探索了经营者个人利益、董事会对资本结构的影响,通过结构方程模型的建立,揭示了其内在关系。结果表明,经营者出于各种利益的考虑对不同的融资方式有所偏好,而董事会作为股东的代表,会在一定程度上影响着经营者的自利行为,并对资本结构产生一种间接的影响。
In this paper, we analyze the impact of managerial self-interest and the board on capital structure based on three-party agency theory. The main results are as follows ： a manger may have different financing preferences for his own-interest and the board as legal representatives for stockholders can restrict the manger＇s behavior and have an indirect influence on capital structure.
出处
《审计与经济研究》
北大核心
2006年第3期80-83,87,共5页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70172018)
关键词
三方代理理论
经营者个人利益
董事会
资本结构
three-party agency theory
managerial self-interest
the board
capital structure
