给定上游独占垄断时下游厂商的创新激励研究

Innovation Incentives of the Duopolists in the Downstream Industry for Given Input Supplier Monopolist

基于上游厂商独占垄断以及下游厂商为同质S tacke lberg或Cournot双头垄断的假设,对上游厂商原料供应最优决策以及下游厂商的均衡利润与创新激励的决定过程进行了论证.结果表明:与上游完全竞争情形相比,上游厂商的独占垄断结构使得下游厂商的显著创新激励大幅下降,但非显著创新激励变化不明显.

For a monopolistic input supplier and homogeneous Stackelberg or Cournot duopolistic firms in the downstream industry, a model is developed to examine how the optimal decision of the monopolist in the upstream industry, the equilibrium payoffs and the innovation incentives of the duopolists in the downstream industry are determined. It is found that the incentives of drastic innovation of duopolists facing a monopolistic input supplier decrease considerably, compared with those facing perfectly competitive input market, while the difference in incentives of non-drastic innovation is not obvious.