我国控制权转移并购中目标公司绩效的实证研究

Empirical Studies on Performance of Object Companies in Corporate Control Replacing Mergers and Acquisitions in China

以我国1993～2003年上市公司控制权转移并购为样本,研究了目标公司在并购前后的股价反应和财务业绩变化.结果表明,公司股票在并购首次公告日前后各1个月内获得显著为正的累积反常收益,但股东因并购增加的财富很可能随时间推移而消散.财务业绩方面,目标公司资产管理效率并未在并购后得到多大改善,盈利能力的大幅提升也以成长性的降低为代价,反映了部分收购者在获取上市公司控制权后行为的短期性.研究还指出,在我国应防止控制权过多转让对上市公司质量的损害.

Based on the sample of corporate control replacing mergers and acquisitions of listed companies from 1993 to 2003 in China, the paper carries out empirical studies on performance of object companies. On the one hand, we find that shareholders of object companies have obtained notable Cumulative Abnormal Returns from one month before announcements to one month after announcements. But the wealth shareholders gained from the acquisitions seem to fade away in several weeks. On the other hand, we find that on average, the profitability of object companies has been much enhanced at the expense of growing capabilities while the operation efficiency of the companies is not improved at all, which implies nearsighted behaviors of the bidders after they taking over the companies. Finally, we table the proposal to protect listed companies from being acquired too frequently.