粮食宏观调控中的信息与激励

The Information and Incentives of the Macro-regulation in the Grain Market

新中国成立后,基于粮食短缺所带来的社会经济后果的体验和判断,我国政府一直采取行政强制手段直接干预粮食生产。该文通过模型分析了在信息不对称的情况下,行政干预不仅无法达到政府干预的目的,甚至会产生更大的背离,进而提出了一个基于市场交易的间接干预方式,试图通过信贷杠杆解决粮食购销市场中的信息与激励问题。

In view of the experiences of and judgments on the social economic aftermath brought by the grain shortage after the establishment of the People's Republic of China,the government has been executing the administrative forcible means to directly control the grain production.By an analysis of a model under the circumstance of the asymmetric information,this article comes to a conclusion that the administrative intervention cannot achieve the goal of govermental intervention,but much deviate from the goal.In this case,the present paper puts forward an indirect means of intervention based on the trade of grain market,trying to solve the problem of information and incentives in the grain market at a financial level.