货币政策:规则还是相机抉择——一个基于博弈视角的分析

Monetary Policy:Rule or Discretion——An Analysis Based on the Perspective of Game Theory

按规则行事还是相机抉择是中央银行的两个替代性选择。本文基于Barro&Gordon模型,运用博弈论这一分析工具,对相机抉择和规则下公众与中央银行的博弈过程进行分析,更清楚地揭示了货币政策的动态一致性。在相机抉择下,中央银行没有能力做出低通货膨胀的承诺,将产生毫无意义的高通货膨胀。规则是一种承诺,中央银行通过做出承诺来约束自身的行动空间,有助于将不受约束的未来政策的外部性予以内部化,实现政策的动态一致,经济达到一个更有效均衡。

Doing by rule and discretion is substitutive choice that the Central Bank faces. Based on the Barro ＆ Gordon model, this paper analyzes the process of the game between the public and the Central Bank under the monetary systems of discretion and rule, revealing the time consistency of the monetary policy more clearly. Under discretion, the Central Bank is not capable of making low-inflation commitment, and the economy will suffer from a good-for-nothing high inflation. Rule is a kind of commitment, the Central Bank restricts its own action by the way of making a commitment, which is helpful to internalize the externality of the policy in the future, then the policy will acquire time consistency, and the economy will reach a more effective equillibrium.