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债权治理初探 被引量:2

A Tentative Study on Creditor Governance
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摘要 负债不仅是企业融通资金的一种方式,还具有公司治理功能。不同种类、期限、优先权的负债,其公司治理效率是不同的。债权治理是指企业债权人作为公司治理主体之一对企业实施的治理。债权治理的方式主要有合同治理、流动性治理和控制权治理等。为了改善和提高我国公司治理效率,实现债权治理,应当建立有效的破产机制、推进国有商业银行的公司化改革、大力发展公司债券市场以及优化企业负债结构,创新负债融资工具等。 Debt, a means of financing, plays the role of the corporate governance.The governance efficiency of the debt varies according to its type, deadline and priority. The creditor governance, mainly including contract governance, liquidity governance and control-right governance, means governing a corporation with creditors function as one of the governance parties. To enhance the governance efficiency of domestic companies and realize creditor governance, the effective bankruptcy system should be built up; the reforms of the stateowned commercial banks should be advanced; the security market should be quickly developed; the debt struture of the firms should be optimized; and the new financing tools concerning debt should be brought forth.
作者 朱静
出处 《贵州大学学报(社会科学版)》 2006年第2期66-68,共3页 Journal of Guizhou University(Social Sciences)
关键词 债权治理 公司治理 负债结构 代理成本 creditor governance corporate governance debt structure agency cost
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参考文献6

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