摘要
给出了激励机制下污染物允许排放总量分配的协商问题的描述,研究了一种基于相互补偿的协商分配模型,探讨了其中将治污成本作为不完全信息的情况,分析和设计了一种具有激励性的分配模型,并讨论了该模型和机制的可行性.污染物允许排放总量分配中的不完全信息给政府的一个重要启示在于:注意排污申报者的策略行为,小心设计各种分配机制,并给予污染源适当的激励,否则不可能获得污染源的真实信息.
Description for an incentive mechanism on allocation of total permitted pollution discharge capacity was given. A negotiate model for allocation of total permitted pollution discharge capacity was studied in accordance with mutual compensation. Cost of pollution treatment was regarded as incomplete information. An incentive mechanism for the discharge capacity allocation was analyzed and designed. Its feasibility was discussed. The research conclusion can give the government an important revelation that the government must pay more attention to the strategy of pollution discharger, the mechanism design, and appropriate incentive to pollution source. Otherwise the real information on pollution source can＇t be acquired.
出处
《华中科技大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第6期103-105,共3页
Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Natural Science Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70471077)
教育部博士学科点专项基金资助项目(20020487046)
湖北省自然科学基金资助项目(2002AB082).
关键词
污染物排放
总量分配
不完全信息
协商机制
激励机制
pollution discharge
total permitted capacity allocation
incomplete information
negotiate mechanism
incentive mechanism
