从三层博弈关系看土地征收制度改革——基于某大学城征地案例的分析

Study on the Reform of Land Expropriation System within 3-level Game Relationships ——Based on Analysis of Land Expropriation Procedure of One University Town

研究目的:分析地方政府和被征地农民、地方政府之间以及地方政府和上级政府间在土地征收上的三层博弈关系,探讨土地征收博弈过程中农民、地方政府、上级政府间的利益关系及由此产生的行为选择以及几者能否取得多赢的可能性,为中国土地征收制度改革方向选择提供理论依据。研究方法:文献资料法、图示法和演绎法。研究结果:中国现行土地征收制度存在诸多弊端,使博弈主体在各自行为上非理性选择。研究结论:中国土地征收制度改革应该使得地方政府违法征地得到的好处变少;地方政府依法征地得到的好处变大;违法征地引起冲突的惩罚成本于地方政府变大,于农民变少;合法征地因被征地农民抵制引发强制执行的成本于政府变少,于农民变大。

The purpose of the study is to provide theoretic data for the reform of land expropriation system by analyzing the benefit relationship among farmers, local government, and government at higher level in land expropriation game, as well as the action induced and the probability to win the game. Methods of documentation, diagramming and deduction were employed. The results indicate that there are many shortcomings in existing land expropriation system that make the actor＇s behavior irrational. The reform of land expropriation system shall make the local government get less benefit through illegal land expropriation, but more benefit through legal land expropriation. The penalty cost of the government to solve the conflicts derived from illegal land expropriation shall be increased. The cost of forceful execution derived from the farmers＇ resistance against legal land expropriation shall be decreased.