摘要
在企业的投融资过程中,企业和投资者之间存在的信息不对称和契约的不完备会产生逆向选择和道德风险等委托代理问题。因此,将不对称信息引入资本市场,利用委托代理理论,能对企业的投融资行为进行解释:企业的投融资方式的选择,就是各个利益相关者为了自身的利益最大化而对剩余索取权和控制权等利益分配及利益冲突的博弈过程,并由此导致了融资约束条件下企业投资行为的差异。
This paper discusses the theory of financing constraint and its development process and conducts the model analysis for it. It points out that the asymmetric information and imperfect contract between the enterprise and investor will lead to the principal-agent problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard during the process of investment and financing. Consequently, the investment of enterprise is a gaming process among interest individuals for their benefit allocation and interest conflict for their own maximization of advantage.
出处
《中国石油大学学报（社会科学版）》
2006年第3期24-28,共5页
Journal of China University of Petroleum (Edition of Social Sciences)
关键词
资本市场
不对称信息
企业
投资
融资
capital market
asymmetric information
enterprise
investment
financing
