日本外务省与1933年中的华北危局——以应对黄郛北上为中心

Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 1933 North China Crisis: Centered on the Responses to Huang Fu's Mission

在塘沽协定缔结之前,日本外务省内部对于中日关系应如何发展出现了意见分歧。这些意见,随着黄郛奉国民政府之命北上处理时局而具体显现出来。在与此事务相关的驻华外交官中,有吉明公使主张应透过支持黄郛,来达成与国民政府的和解并进而与其合作。然而一等书记官中山详一等人则大致接受关东军的主张,认为应在华北成立一个实质上脱离国民政府控制的政权。初采模糊立场的内田康哉外相,其立场大致倾向于中山等人。他最终否决了有吉的构想,并试图与国民政府签订一个政治协定。此一过程具体显现了当时外务省内部在对华外交构想上存在着分歧,以及其对华强硬派常占上风的历史事实。

Before the conclusion of the Tanggu Truce, there was a divergence of opinion among officers of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the future of Sino-Japanese relations. The divergence became more conspicuous after the Nationalist Government appointed Huang Fu to settle issues in North China. Among Japanese diplomats in China, Ambassador Ariyoshi Akira advocated supporting Huang Fu in order to reach an amicable agreement with the Nationalist government, and thereby improve cooperation between the two countries. However, First Secretary Nakayama Shoichi and others generally accepted the Kwangtung Army's position that an effectively independent government should be set up in North China. Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya held an ambiguous stance at first, but he generally inclined toward the Nakayama group. In the end, he vetoed Ariyoshi's ideas and tried to sign a political agreement with the Nationalist government. This process is a concrete demonstration of the existence of a divergence of opinion over relations with China inside the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time, as well as the historical reality that the hardliners more often than not gained the upper hand.