国家控股、超额雇员与劳动力成本

State Stockholder, Excessive Employment and Labor Cost

与以往很多直接检验股权性质与公司绩效之关系的研究不同,本文选择1999—2002年健康运营的上市公司为样本,从公司雇员角度研究了控股股东的所有制性质对上市公司社会性负担的影响。经验证据表明,国家控股公司比非国家控股公司雇佣了更多的员工,并且国家控股公司的超额雇员主要源自上市初的历史遗留冗员;超额雇员和高工资率共同导致国家控股公司承担了比非国家控股公司更高的劳动力成本。此外,还发现在国家控股公司中,国资部门控股公司的超额雇员最多、劳动力成本最高;并且相对其他公司而言,该类公司上市后可能继续超额雇员。因此,推进上市公司产权多元化改革和避免国家直接控股,对改善公司治理具有积极意义。

Different from many papers which directly testing the relationship between ownership and corporate value, this paper studies whether ultimate ownership nature of the largest shareholder affected the corporate social burdens with a proxy of corporate employment. We find that mainly resulting from excess employment at IPO time, state-controlled firms employed significantly more labor than the others did during our observed windows, and excess employment and high wage rate together made state-controlled firms assumed greater labor costs than the others did. We also find that among state controlled companies, government agency controlled companies employed most labors and assumed highest labor cost, and compared to others, their excess employments may be expanding after IPOs. The findings imply that the largest shareholder＇s ownership nature and the manners of government control are important to China listed companies, and property diversification reforms and avoidance of direct state-controlling are meaningful to improve corporate governance.