多任务委托代理模型下国企经理激励问题研究

Multitask principal-agent model and study on SOE managers' incentive issues

运用多任务委托代理模型研究国企经理的最优激励合同后得出,若多工作任务努力的激励成本之间相互独立,那么激励相容条件下的各工作任务的最优业绩报酬也是相互独立的,且最优业绩报酬是绝对风险规避度、边际激励成本变化率和可观测变量方差的递减函数;而如果多工作任务激励成本是相互依存的,那么在激励相容条件下,政治性活动和满足上级偏好的最优激励合同为“门槛型激励合同”,即只有当国企经理所创造的业绩超过一定的“门槛值”时,对其的激励才是正向的,否则将是负向的.并且定量地给出了国企经理的“门槛型激励条件”.

Using the muhi-task principal-agent model, this study analyzes the SOE（state owned enterprise） manager＇s incentive contracts in two aspects： the tasks are inter-independent and inter-dependent. We find that, when the tasks are inter-dependent, the incentive contract with a SOE manager is not only multi-tasked, but also threshed. That is, the incentive for a SOE manager is positive only when both the SOE manager＇s political performanee and preference performance satisfy the threshed incentive conditions simultaneously; otherwise, it is negative. The threshed incentive conditions are thereby presented in this article.