为弗雷格的语句指称为真值的观点而辩

Defending Frege’s View of Truth-value as Sentence Nominatum

文章在综述弗雷格涵义和指称理论基本内容的基础上,首先从理论产生的哲学背景和逻辑悖论的角度对其语句指称为真值的观点进行辩护,而后又结合弗雷格关于涵义和指称的定义,对专名和语句的指称空类现象提出一些个人见解。

On the basis of a brief summery of the theory, this paper first of all defends Frege＇s view from the philosophical and logical stand, and then presents some personal viewpoints about null classes of proper names and sentences.