摘要
对金融企业业务运行的监管是规范金融市场、控制金融风险的一个主要的途径。随着市场化金融监管程度的不断提高,我们有必要研究金融监管机构策略选择和金融企业之间策略选择的相互影响关系,特别是金融企业形成良好的业务运营预期所需要的约束条件。本文试图通过动态博弈模型的建立、分析来研究上述问题,并对金融监管改革时期的策略取向提出建议。
The supervision of the operation of financial enterprises is a major approach to standardize financial market and control financial risks in China. As the degree of financial supervision according to market rules constantly improves, it is necessary to research the interrelation between the strategy choice of finance supervising institutions and that of financial enterprises, especially the restricting conditions for financial enterprises to form favorable operation expectation. The author tries to discuss the above questions by building and analyzing dynamic models and raise some advise on the strategic orientations of the reform in financial supervision.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第4期21-24,共4页
Economic Survey
关键词
收入分配
社会公平
利益集团
既得利益集团
dynamic game
financial supervision
honesty and credit
behavioral expectation