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以国企改革为目标的机构投资者:证券市场的稳定力量 被引量:1

Cultivating Institutional Investors with Reform of State-owned Enterprise as the Goal: Stabilizing Power of Securities
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摘要 我国证券市场的发展肩负着国企改革的重任,国有控股下的委托-代理关系决定了上市公司的低质量,低质量的上市公司又决定了市场主体的投机性行为,证券市场剧烈的波动也就不可避免。股价相对稳定是证券市场发展的前提,在低质量上市公司背景下寻求一股重要的市场稳定力量,是实现国企改革目标和投资者双赢的现实选择。 The development of our securities market undertakes the task of reform of state - owned enterprises . State - owned principal- agent relationship results in the low quality of listed companies, which then results in speculating behaviors and inevitably great violation of securities market. Relative stability of stock price is the basis of the development of securities market. In the background of listed companies of low quality, seeking an important market stabilizing power is a realistic choice to realize the goal of state - owned enterprises reform and investors' bilateral - win.
作者 李腊生
出处 《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第7期19-22,共4页 Modern Finance and Economics:Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
关键词 国企改革 上市公司 开放式基金 Reform of State - owned Enterprises Listed Company Open - end Fund
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参考文献4

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