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管理学与经济学对人的激励模式差异——兼评国有企业管理者激励 被引量:1

The Difference Incentive Patterns of Management and Economics:Analysis of Managerial Incentives in State-owned Enterprises
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摘要 由于管理者的需求是多方面的,从而使管理者激励在实践中遇到很多困难。文章比较了管理学与经济学对人的激励模式差异,分析了各自假设条件下的激励模式在实际应用中的局限性。并针对当前我国国有企业管理者的激励问题,指出单一物质激励容易导致管理者行为短期化,认为建立有效的国有企业管理者激励模式应该引入管理者的职业声誉、事业成就感和社会地位等长期激励机制。 The managerial incentives come across many practical difficulties due to various demands of managers. This paper compares the difference of incentive patterns between management and economics, and analyzes the limitations of incentive pattern on their respective hypothesis in practical applications. Taking intoaccount the managerial incentive problems of state - owned enterprises in China, single material incentive is more inclined to lead to short -term managers' behaviors. Hence, such as professional reputation, career achievements and social status, those long - term incentive mechanisms should be introduced to establish a valid managerial incentive system for state -owned enterprises.
作者 李春琦
出处 《郑州航空工业管理学院学报》 2006年第3期58-62,共5页 Journal of Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics
关键词 管理学 经济学 激励模式 国有企业 管理者 science of manage science of economy incentive pattern state - owned enterprises managers
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参考文献6

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