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基于猜测供给函数的需求弹性对电力市场运行的影响 被引量:4

The Impacts of Demand Elasticity on the Electricity Markets Performance based on the Conjecture Supply Function
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摘要 影响市场运行的一个重要因素是需求弹性。低需求弹性将导致市场出清价格高,市场运行效率低,经济效益分配不合理。由于电力商品的特殊性,目前电力市场本质上具有寡头竞争的特点。相对较完全的竞争市场,发电商的策略竟标行为将导致市场运行在低效率水平下,这一消极因素在低需求弹性下尤为突出。为此提出了一个能评估需求弹性对发电商策略竞标行为影响的模型。该模型将发电商的博弈行为模拟成猜测供给函数(conjiecture supply function,CSF)竞争,同时将交易市场中的用户需求弹性包含在数学模型中。通过对意大利电力市场的单时段交易的模拟,运用一系列指标来量化评估需求弹性对具有寡头竞争性质的市场运行的影响。 One of the most important aspects that may affect market welfare is that related to the low demand elasticity. This situation may greatly impact the market performance causing low efficiency, high prices and a disproportional allocation of surpluses. The structure of electricity markets is usually oligopolistic. The possibility of gaming the market is amplified in the presence of low demand elasticity. This paper proposes a model to assess the role of demand elasticity in mitigating the effects of supply side strategic bidding behavior. We model the supply side in a Conjecture Supply Function (CSF) framework, which allows incorporation of exogenous changes in demand elasticity and different levels of competition in a given market. The impacts of demand responsiveness on the market performances are assessed through a set of proposed indices that are applied to a model of the Italian market.
出处 《中国电机工程学报》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2006年第13期50-55,共6页 Proceedings of the CSEE
基金 国家自然科学基金重点项目(50539140)中国-欧盟电气工程合作项目(ASI/B7-301/98/679-026-ECLEE)。~~
关键词 电力市场 需求弹性 策略竞标 猜测供给函数 electricity markets demand elasticity strategic bidding conjecture supply function
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