我国新《会计法》实施效果的一个博弈分析

A Game-theoretic Analysis of the Results of Enforcing the New PRC' Accounting Law

本文运用博弈论分析方法,从不完全信息静态博弈的角度,结合近几年来财政部每年一次的“会计信息质量抽查公告”和“《会计法》执行情况大检查公告”,对我国新《会计法》的实施效果进行了分析。通过分析,从理论上解释和说明了我国新《会计法》在约束人们的会计行为、提高会计信息质量、完善会计监督等方面所起的积极作用,也指出了新《会计法》在会计监督、对违法违规行为处罚等方面存在的制度缺陷。进而,就如何完善我国新《会计法》和会计监督等提出了自己的建议。

This paper makes use of game-theoretic analysis to analyze the result of enforcing the new PRC＇ accounting law from the view of static game with incomplete information and based on the announcements of spot-checking about the quality of accounting information. Through this analysis, We explained and showed from theoretically that our new country＇s accounting law has had the positive role in binding people＇s accountancy action, improving the quantity of accounting information, and perfecting accounting supervision, etc. and also pointed out that it had some institution defect in accounting supervision and penalizing the peoples who violated the law and discipline. And then, We put our suggestions about how to improve our new accounting law and accounting supervision.