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自愿性会计信息披露:临界水平、选择性与管制支持 被引量:3

Voluntary Accounting Information Disclosure:Critical Mass,Selectiveness and Regulation
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摘要 文章讨论了会计信息披露制度的演进过程,并将自愿性会计信息披露与强制性会计信息披露置于该过程来考察,提出两种争论不休的披露观点在经济本质上具有共性。通过分析企业清算价值和相关会计信息变量的分布,证明了自愿性会计信息披露存在临界水平,使自愿会计信息披露表现出选择性特征。分析指出,自愿性会计信息披露的选择性特征,支持了强制性会计信息披露的管制需求。因而,会计信息披露制度的安排,不应在自愿性和强制性之间进行不相容选择,而更重要的是在非管制条件下的效率损失、管制条件下的收益和管制成本三者之间进行权衡。 The paper examined the evolution of accounting information disclosure, and reviewed the voluntary accounting information disclosure and mandatory one. Based on the analysis of enterprise liquidation and relevant information distribution, the paper proved that there was critical mass in voluntary information disclosure accounting information disclosure and selectiveness in mandatory which required regulation. Therefore the priority of arrangement accounting for the accounting information disclosure would put on the balance among efficiency loss under non - regulation, benefit and regulation cost under regulation.
作者 彭家生
出处 《云南财经大学学报》 2006年第3期122-128,共7页 Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics
基金 社会科学规划资助项目(云宣通〔2005〕35号-22)
关键词 会计信息披露 临界水平 选择性披露 管制支持 制度安排 Accounting Information Disclosure Critical Mass Selective Disclosure Regulation Institution Arrangement
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参考文献6

  • 1小约翰·科菲,徐菁,焦津洪.市场失灵与强制披露制度的经济分析[J].经济社会体制比较,2002(1):12-22. 被引量:54
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二级参考文献13

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