信息不对称、道德风险与市场纪律——国际金融监管新趋势的模型解析

信息披露不充分的金融市场上,单纯的资本充足率监管无法有效地控制银行的道德风险。一个有效的监管制度还有赖于市场纪律的约束。本文在对20世纪金融监管历史进行简要回顾的基础上,运用信息经济学的有关原理,对当前的国际金融监管发展的新趋势进行模型分析,并对其政策含义进行初步的探讨。

Financial liberalization increases the information asymmetric between the regulator and the banks. Capital requirements alone are insufficient to prevent the moral hazard of the banks, An effective prudential regulation relies on the banks＇ self-discipline and the market discipline too. And in this paper , we want to analyze the new trend of the banking supervision with a model of information economics after we have gone over its history of the past century . Some police will be provided as a conclusion in the end of our paper.