垂直品质差异与技术授权策略选择

Vertical-Differentiation and Licensing Strategies

本文在专利权人不参与市场生产的情况下,分别在无技术授权、按定额权利金方式授权、按单位权利金授权以及混合式授权等四种情况,来讨论本国独占厂商的产品品质与价格的决定、外国专利权人授权策略的选择以及相关福利水准的影响。本文发现定额权利金授权下的社会福利、消费者剩余与产品品质,均优于无技术授权、按单位权利金与按混合式授权的结果;在市场规模相对较小下,按单位权利金授权,本国厂商利润达到最高;在有技术授权的情况下,社会福利、消费者剩余与产品品质将恒不劣于无技术授权。

This paper, assuming the licensor does not participate in any production in the market, is to explore the following issues： how the domestic monopolist governs his product price and quality under four different contexts, say no technology licensing, fixed fee royalty, unit royalty, and mixed licensing etc. ; how the foreign licensor decides his licensing strategy, and how these decisions affect the welfare. In this study, it is found that the social welfare, consumer surplus, and the production quality under fixed fee royalty are better than those under other conditions： no technology licensing, unit royalty, and mixed licensing etc. However, as the market is relatively smaller, the domestic finn＇s profit under unit royalty is the highest among all the forgoing conditions. The social welfare, consumer surplus, and the production quality, no matter under what form of technology licensing, are by all means no less than that without technology licensing.