国际组织的自主性行为:两种理论视角及其比较

International Organizations' independent Behavior:Two Theoretical Perspectives and Their Comparison

20世纪60、70年代曾经出现过一次国际组织的研究浪潮。通过大量的案例分析,一些学者发现了国际组织具有不受其成员国意志掌控的自主性行为这一经验现象。冷战结束后,随着经济全球化的突飞猛进和国际组织治理任务的日益增多,针对国际组织的自主性行为这一经验现象,学者们运用了委托-代理理论和社会学制度主义两种分析工具对其进行了学理解析。本文对委托-代理模式和社会学制度主义在国际组织自主性行为的发生基础、行为动力和实践表现等问题上的主要观点进行了梳理和概述,并对两种理论视角进行了简要的比较。文章指出,委托-代理模式对国际组织的行为偏好认识不足,社会学制度主义对外部环境压力对国际组织的影响有所忽视,在对具体问题的分析中,需要将两种理论视角有机地结合起来,这样才能更加全面、深刻地认识和理解国际组织自主性行为的根源和本质。

In the 1960s to 1970s, a wave emerged in the study of international organizations. Through lots of case studies, the empirical phenomenon that international organizations have their independent behavior uncontrolled by their member countries was found by some scholars. After the cold war, with the rapid development of economic globalization and the increase of international organizations＇ governance tasks, the scholars analyzed and explained the empirical phenomenon of international organizations＇ independent behavior by adopting principal-agent theory and sociological institutionalism. This article summarizes the principal-agent model and sociological institutionalism＇s main viewpoints on the basis, dynamics and performance of international organizations＇ independent behavior, and then makes a brief comparison of the two theoretical perspectives.